In its approach to advancing the rule of law, however, the Obama administration failed to understand the consequences of legal pluralism, in which "two or more legal systems coexist in the same social ªeld." 5 There never was a justice vacuum in Afghanistan. 6 Nonstate justice, particularly the local community dispute-resolution mechanisms known as jirgas and shuras, maintained legal order in most of the country. 7 Simultaneously, Taliban justice began successfully asserting itself against the state in many places, not merely ªlling a void.
The state-building endeavor in Afghanistan has constituted a major U.S. foreign policy and national security priority for more than a decade. 8 The rebuilding effort received an extraordinarily high level of international support. In fact, the Afghan state depended on U.S. support to undertake even its most basic of functions, such as maintaining police, courts, and the military. 9 In the justice sector, roughly 90 percent of funding came from foreign sources-most notably, Western donor-states and international institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 10 The Obama administration not only continued the George W. Bush administration's efforts to bolster Afghanistan's state justice system, but dramatically increased funding to judicial institutions. This funding increase ignored that similar initiatives had achieved little in the past. Despite billions in spending, decades of experience with post-conºict state-building, and a comprehensive review of the U.S. approach to Afghanistan, U.S. decisionmakers still failed to craft a policy response that accurately conceptualized the complex legal landscape as well as reºected the long-standing cultural and religious foundations of legitimate state legal order. 11 with Afghanistan's state justice sector, which has received the bulk of scholarly attention so far, but also with the nonstate legal systems that settle the vast majority of legal disputes. 17 Afghanistan constitutes a crucial test case for international state-building efforts as well as a rich source of "lessons learned" for policymakers. 18 The article is divided into four major sections. The ªrst section examines the complex, highly pluralistic legal landscape before and during U.S. judicial state-building endeavors in Afghanistan. Although the state legal sector has been the primary recipient of U.S. assistance, most disputes in the country are still settled outside the state courts. 19 Nonstate justice is essential for understanding the overarching structure of Afghanistan's legal order. The second section examines the major U.S. rule-of-law programs funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and the Department of Defense from 2004 to 2014. The third section analyzes the strategy, assumptions, and theory that underpinned U.S.-funded judicial statebuilding projects. It argues that, examined comprehensively, U.S. efforts to advance the rule of law in Afghanistan during both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations failed to achieve meaningful progress because their initiatives consistently reºected a deeply ºawed set of assumptions. The fourth section examines the insights from U.S. efforts to promote rule of law both for Afghanistan and for post-conºict judicial state-building more broadly. It highlights the need for swift action after conºict, reforms to the U.S. assistance oversight and implementation process, and policy approaches that address the justice sector holistically and maintain an overarching commitment to democracy and the rule of law.
A Crowded Legal Landscape
Afghanistan's origin is conventionally dated to 1747. Judicial state-building had formed a major state priority since the late nineteenth century, but state power hinged upon relationships with religious and tribal authorities. 20 The most effective form of legal order was not state law, but Pashtunwali, 21 a nonstate legal code that continues to serve as both "an ideology and a body of common law which has evolved its own sanctions and institutions." Historically, Pashtuns have implemented the legal code through jirgas, while shuras perform a similar function for non-Pashtuns. 22 All legitimate statesponsored legal orders in Afghan history have been grounded in a combination of state performance, Islam, and tribal approval. Slowly but surely, the central government's state-building made progress and the country enjoyed domestic tranquility, albeit against a backdrop of low levels of economic development, until a communist coup toppled the regime in 1978, plunging the country into decades of civil strife under communist and then mujahideen rule. 23 Eventually the Taliban seized control. During the mid-1990s, the Taliban imposed a harsh, but effective state legal order based on religious authority with acquiescence from tribal justice authorities. 24 Although the Taliban enjoyed ªrm control domestically, foreign policy decisions proved the regime's undoing. Most notoriously, the Taliban regime harbored the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States. Shortly thereafter, a major international effort in support of the Northern Alliance, a preexisting domestic military front that opposed the regime, toppled the Taliban in late 2001.
Rule of Law in
The Afghan people were ready for a fresh start that promised law and order coupled with democratic accountability. 25 From the beginning, however, the institutional arrangements of governance were not particularly conducive to the rule of law. President Karzai and his allies stressed the importance of a strong, independently elected executive to bring order, peace, and stabilitya vision institutionalized in the 2004 constitution. Establishing a presidential system does not necessarily preclude democratization or development of a state bound by the rule of law. 26 Executed in accordance with the law and subject to legal and democratic accountability mechanisms, concentrated state authority can "allow the community to deploy that power to enforce laws, keep International the peace, defend itself against outside enemies, and provide necessary public goods." 27 Excessive consolidation of state power in one person, however, can facilitate authoritarianism, undercut democratic pluralism, and circumvent legal accountability. 28 The international community, and particularly the United States, bears signiªcant responsibility for these poor institutional choices. U.S. policymakers strongly backed Karzai as Afghanistan's interim leader and then president based on the ºawed assumption that doing so would ensure stability and smooth bilateral relations. 29 They also agreed to deny any meaningful power for provincial governors and allowed the president plenary power over their appointment. 30 U.S. decisionmakers acquiesced to Karzai's selection of a convoluted and unrepresentative system for parliamentary elections that offered strong disincentives for the creation of political parties, so vital for the representation of diverse social groups in a democratic polity. 31 After the Taliban's collapse in late 2001, the state legal system was in shambles. Although there was some progress in rebuilding the justice system's formal components, the Karzai regime, which was dominated by Northern Alliance warlords, did not seek to institutionalize the rule of law. In contrast, it behaved like a "vertically integrated criminal organization . . . whose core activity was not in fact exercising the functions of a state but rather extracting resources for personal gain." 32 The regime prevented rivals from seizing control of the state and its lucrative patronage networks by bending the state's pliant institutions to serve its interests. In theory, state legal order was based on codes and legislation, and rooted in the civil law tradition. The reality was quite different. Although the constitution proclaimed judicial independence, the courts were ªrmly under the executive's control; highly susceptible to outside inºuences; and widely seen as corrupt, predatory, and rent seeking. 33 The dismal performance of Afghanistan's state courts bolstered the appeal of nonstate justice systems. 34 Hard data are rare, but it is estimated that even after the collapse of the Taliban regime, 80 to 90 percent of legal disputes were addressed by nonstate justice systems, most often rooted in tribal law. 35 Most Afghans overwhelmingly preferred the nonstate justice offered by shuras and jirgas over that meted out by the new regime. 36 Nonstate actors derive their authority largely from sources beyond the state, which often allows them to maintain a signiªcant degree of autonomy. 37 When powerful enough, as in Afghanistan, they can function as state-building spoilers. 38 Although jirgas and shuras remain the default dominant forms of dispute resolution for many Afghans, tribal law codes, such as Pashtunwali, should not be idealized. Pashtunwali remains a harsh system of justice with few human rights protections. 39 Reºecting a long history of weak central rule, it relies on the legal principle of self-help to remedy violations. Self-enforced remedies for tribal law violations are notoriously difªcult to extract proportionately and frequently spur further violence. Tribal law in Afghanistan is also systematically biased against women. As a matter of law, women are regulated to an intrinsically subordinate position, and forced marriage can even be used as compensation. 40 The post-2001 era also saw challenges to the state legal order from warlords and the Taliban. Both the Bonn agreement, which outlined the parameters of the post-conºict transition, and the political party law, which regulated the structure of organized political competition, envisioned the disarmament of warlords who had been largely suppressed by the Taliban. In reality, the Karzai government and international forces relied on "pro-government or more accurately 'anti-Taliban' warlords to maintain order at the local and regional level." 41 In many cases, these were the same strongmen whose previous rule had sparked such widespread anger that the Taliban became a compara-International Security 42:1 120 35. See Barªeld, Nojumi, and Their, "The Clash of Two Goods," p. 9. Afghanistan is not an outlier. In many developing and most post-conºict countries, nonstate justice systems often function as the primary dispute resolution mechanisms, even as the state seeks to develop and assert the dominance of the tively appealing alternative in the 1990s. Under the post-2001 regime, warlords reemerged and focused on structuring the political and legal order in their areas. 42 Shortly thereafter, a network of warlords became a long-term, destructive ªxture of the Afghan political scene. 43 Despite losing power in 2001, the reconstituted Taliban quickly established itself as the state's ªercest judicial rival as early as 2003. Taliban justice became a centerpiece of a full-blown insurgency by 2006. 44 Effective legal order constituted the core of the Taliban's political program, underpinned their claim to be Afghanistan's legitimate rulers, and highlighted the state justice system's failures. Taliban insurgents actively contended with the state legal system, especially outside the capital. The Taliban operated "a parallel legal system that is acknowledged by local communities as being legitimate, fair, free of bribery, swift, and enduring." 45 Moreover, their justice system was "easily one of the most popular and respected elements of the Taliban insurgency by local communities, especially in southern Afghanistan." 46 Taliban justice sought to provide what the state justice system did not: predictable, effective, legitimate, and accessible dispute resolution.
In short, U.S. efforts to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan never occurred in a justice vacuum but rather in an ever-more crowded, highly contested and violent space. Efforts to promote the rule of law would have to convince a skeptical population, engage with entrenched tribal justice mechanisms, and ultimately defeat armed actors overseeing a parallel legal system. Although certainly not impossible, this task represented a serious challenge. The U.S. policy response, however, was strikingly simplistic.
Promoting the Rule of Law in Practice
The United States espoused an interest in advancing the rule of law in Afghanistan, but this goal was secondary to bolstering the Karzai regime, which lacked a commitment to either democracy or the rule of law. Karzai's administration prioritized retaining power, collecting rents, and exercising au- thority unconstrained by legal requirements. 47 U.S. policymakers were so fearful that the Taliban might return to power that they were not prepared to meaningfully challenge the regime's increasingly anti-democratic tendencies, corruption, and lawlessness.
Paradoxically, despite the justice sector's extreme dependence on foreign aid, international actors' ability to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan was heavily circumscribed. In theory, aid dependence should increase the state's reliance on continued aid ºows and, therefore, on donors. This dynamic would seem to provide major donors with meaningful inºuence over the recipient state's decisions and actions. Donors, however, dislike being seen as dictating state behavior. 48 Program implementers in Afghanistan faced structural constraints that hindered their ability to promote the rule of law. Donors assess implementers based on their ability to execute stipulated programming deliverables, which almost always involves working with state institutions. This dynamic demands state consent regardless of whether ofªcials are committed to programmatic principles. Programs that fail to execute are viewed poorly by donors and endanger future contracts. 49 Program implementers have strong incentives to collaborate with deeply corrupt state institutions, provided their leaders are willing to at least pay lip service to rule-of-law ideals. These problems were compounded in Afghanistan by its steadily deteriorating security situation, which limited the areas and types of work that could be done at an acceptable level of risk.
Even when Italy was technically the justice sector's "lead nation" from 2002 to 2006, the United States was the most inºuential international actor. 50 As is shown below, the United States funded a multitude of major initiatives through USAID, the State Department, and later the Defense Department totaling more than $1 billion on more than sixty programs. 51 Not The program instructed more than 1,000 judges as well as approximately 60 law professors and 100 university administrators. 54 AROLP produced legal materials and sought to improve the courts' administrative capacities. As with the vast majority of rule-of-law assistance, it was highly technocratic and statecentric. In its later years, as state-focused initiatives were already beginning to fall short of expectations, AROLP displayed some interest in the nonstate justice sector. Programmers believed that "the linkage between the formal and informal justice sectors [was] essential to improving the rule of law in Afghanistan." 55 AROLP sponsored research on nonstate justice and tried to increase citizens' awareness of the state justice system, along with "their legal rights and responsibilities under the Constitution of Afghanistan." 56 The program also advocated for "a national policy on state relations with informal justice mechanisms." 57 While AROLP worked with various justice-sector institutions, the Supreme Court was its most important partner. The Supreme Court's consent was es- sential for most programming, but the judiciary was not independent in practice. 58 As a result, Supreme Court judges had little incentive or ability to foster the rule of law, particularly if it involved challenging executive power. The Supreme Court consistently upheld executive authority regardless of how dubious the exercise of that power, including in conºicts over the scope of executive power, election administration, and the removal of presidential appointees. 59 AROLP did little to address structural problems in the Afghan justice sector or constructively engage the nonstate sector. This dynamic is evident based on the program's chosen evaluation criteria: (1) creation of a "national policy on the informal justice sector" and (2) usage of state courts as reºected in survey results. 60 A nonstate justice policy was developed by domestic and international actors, marking the ªrst ofªcial recognition of nonstate justice authorities. Despite formal agreement at the ministerial level, the policy did not reºect a real consensus because it relied on ambiguous language to paper over major differences and did not involve any serious engagement with nonstate judicial actors.
The second evaluation criterion was equally problematic. First, projects were predicated on the simplistic and inaccurate belief common to rule-of-law programs that informing people about the state courts and their rights will improve the rule of law. 61 Second, the program sought to channel people to state courts regardless of the consequences. Courts were initially underresourced, both ªnancially and in terms of human resources. They were also slow, expensive, and possessed limited enforcement capacity. Worse, they were often corrupt, predatory, and rent seeking. 62 It made little sense to direct cases into the state justice system regardless of the quality and capacity of its courts. As the ªrst major USAID rule-of-law program, AROLP did next to nothing to advance the rule of law. By 2009, promoting a just, viable legal order was increasingly seen as a potent weapon in the ªght against an increasingly powerful Taliban insurgency that drew strength from the Afghan government's unwillingness to address the state's immense corruption. 63 USAID funded two related rule-of-law programs. Rule of Law Stabilization-Formal Component (RLS-Formal) sought to "develop[] a justice system that is both effective and enjoys wide respect among Afghan citizens is critical to stabilizing democracy and bringing peace to the country." 64 Rule of Law Stabilization-Informal Component (RLS-Informal) shared a similar premise, as it aimed "to 'promote and support the informal justice system in key post-conºict areas' as a way of improving stabilization." 65 rls-formal. The international development contractor Tetra Tech DPK was chosen to implement RLS-Formal from May 2010 to September 2014, at a cost of more than $47.5 million. The program's goals were strikingly similar to those of AROLP. RLS-Formal emphasized "capacity building" of judicial actors and administrators, as well as improving legal education and raising "public legal capacity and awareness." 66 RLS-Formal supported extensive training and technical assistance programs, along with the development of educational materials and strategic plans. There were also public information campaigns and attempts to strengthen the public outreach capacity of the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice. Most participants viewed the trainings positively, 67 but RLS-Formal faced chronic difªculties. The program emphasized "[improving] the public image and use of the formal judiciary," 68 but improving public perception risked enabling rent seeking. RLS-Formal ignored structural issues with the underlying political economy of the Afghan justice system, including the lack of judicial independence and endemic corruption. As before, public service announcements encouraging more people to use a highly corrupt justice system did little to improve the rule of law and threatened to further undermine Afghans' faith in the judicial system.
Programming, again, depended on consent from the institutional actors responsible for many of these problems. These actors had little incentive to facilitate changes that threatened the larger political and legal order. Tetra Tech's ªnal report is strikingly forthright in this regard. After noting major challenges with corruption and "weak political support for rule of law reforms," the report explains: "The most difªcult barriers to overcome during project implementation, and the barriers that threaten the sustainability of project initiatives, are a lack of willingness among counterpart institutions to support and adopt reforms, and a failure to allocate sufªcient funds to maintain quality trainings for current and future justice-sector personnel. Leadership at counterpart institutions continues to demonstrate a lack of commitment to justice sector reforms by delaying the approval of tools and technologies that will increase the efªciency and transparency of courts." 69 The Supreme Court was particularly problematic because it received and oversaw external aid but lacked a commitment to the rule of law. Tetra Tech observed that frequently, "when the Supreme Court was asked to approve new initiatives or reforms, the institution tended to make approval contingent on future events that never happened." 70 It determined that the Supreme Court's attitude reºected a clear "reluctance to embrace new processes and procedures that increase the efªciency, transparency, accountability, and fairness in the justice sector." 71 Thus, RLS-Formal initiatives had little prospect for sustainability or fostering meaningful institutional change.
Although Tetra Tech implemented the program, USAID deserves the most strident criticism. It designed the program and continually displayed almost willful blindness to political reality. As the Ofªce of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) notes, "USAID nearly doubled funding, even though it knew the Afghan Supreme Court was not interested in funding or otherwise sustaining those activities." 72 Programming never meaningfully engaged with the long-standing pillars of legitimacy in Afghanistan: religion, cultural norms, and provision of public goods. Instead, the focus was on public relations. RLS-Formal sought to improve the judiciary's image based on the mistaken idea that the potential users lacked sufªcient information about state courts, but Afghans already recognized that courts were not credible dispute resolution forums. Neither judicial performance nor public perception of the judiciary improved. 73 Avoidance of the courts was entirely rational. Even if the quality of justice had improved through training or administrative reform, nothing in the program addressed the judicial system's inability to enforce its judgments or prevent outside interference. rls-informal. By 2010, policymakers increasingly viewed nonstate justice as a more productive avenue for international engagement. This belief was the animating idea behind RLS-Informal. The nearly $40 million Checchiadministered RLS-Informal program operated from 2010 to 2014. RLS-Informal emphasized "access to fair, transparent, and accountable justice for men, women, and children by (1) improving and strengthening the traditional dispute resolution system, (2) bolstering collaboration between the informal and formal justice systems, and (3) supporting cooperation for the resolution of longstanding disputes." 74 It sought to improve the quality of nonstate justice and to strengthen linkages between the state and nonstate justice systems. The program's more pressing goal, however, was to supplement and consolidate U.S.-led counterinsurgency efforts. RLS-Informal envisioned ªlling the supposed "justice vacuum" in territories that had "been 'cleared and held' by the military and the Taliban 'courts' removed." 75 Localized nonstate justice mechanisms were to be strengthened, or in some instances created, to prevent "'teetering' areas from reverting back to Taliban justice and inºuence." 76 RLS-Informal engaged with nonstate judicial actors in targeted areas. Yet, the program largely echoed work done for state actors and drew on the same highly suspect template. Capacity building was a major focus for elders and other informal-justice actors. Trainings addressed state and Sharia law as well as ad- RLS-Informal attempted to engage with the long-standing pillars of legal legitimacy by working within the tribal system. It sought to capitalize on the perceived desire of many local actors to increase their social standing. 78 From the donors' perspective, this dynamic could allow them to more effectively provide order. The external evaluation does identify some modest changes in response to outside assistance, 79 but local justice actors certainly did not change their approach to state justice. Although RLS-Informal sought to increase linkages between state and nonstate justice, the ºow was one directional. More cases were referred to the nonstate system, but referrals to state courts did not increase. 80 This dynamic reºects Afghans' continued low regard for state courts.
Strengthening nonstate justice raised even more logistical issues than strengthening the state system. A judge may be corrupt or unwilling to engage program implementers, but at least it is clear who is and is not a judge. When engaging tribal or religious authorities, participant selection was an inherently fraught process. Program staff genuinely attempted to understand each locality. Nevertheless, grasping local dynamics and how international assistance would subsequently inºuence communal relations far exceeded their technical capacity. Although reports cast local participants as motivated solely by a desire to help the broader community, often they were more motivated by the ability of international assistance to enhance their inºuence. 81 Equally troubling, the program lacked a clear, coherent approach for navigating the tensions between state law, including international human rights norms, and Sharia law. Program decisions were inevitably somewhat ad hoc and based on short-term calculations. While RLS-Informal reºected some knowledge of local realities, insurgents almost invariably knew areas better. International intervention occasionally even made local tensions worse and resolution of longstanding disputes more difªcult. 82 Counterinsurgency was the U.S. government's top priority. RLS-Informal envisioned strengthening the nonstate justice sector to undercut the Taliban's justice system. Simple enough in theory, but it proved deeply challenging and often counterproductive. First, RLS-Informal laid the groundwork for counterinsurgency efforts on the shaky foundation of the local authorities most willing to collaborate with the United States rather than the most inºuential religious and tribal authorities. Therefore, program achievements inherently depended on outside support and quickly evaporated once that support was gone. Second, RLS-Informal's short-term approach generated pressure for quick wins and demonstrable metrics, but even these were often in short supply. 83 Third, the approach incorrectly assumed the existence of a justice vacuum in which new dispute-resolution efforts could thrive. If there were truly a void, then RLS-Informal's efforts to strengthen or create new nonstate dispute resolution mechanisms would have made sense. In reality, tribal structure, warlords, or the Taliban underpinned order at the local level. RLS-Informal's favored local representatives were often not the most prominent community members. Whatever authority these individuals had largely reºected international assistance rather than local standing. Shuras set up by international actors could be destabilizing by distributing large amounts of external funding as well as empowering individuals through military force who may not have enjoyed substantial popular support. Interviewers who worked on internationally funded nonstate justice programs even suggested that some individuals with access to international support used aid and the threat of U.S. military force to pursue personal agendas and vendettas. 84 RLS-Informal failed to understand that providing an alternative justice venue alone was insufªcient to counter the Taliban. In many cases, Taliban justice was comparatively well regarded, particularly in the Pashtun heartland. 85 The Taliban actively sought to prevent local communities from using state courts or U.S.-backed dispute resolution forums. Taliban issued "night letters" threatening to kill all individuals and the entire families of those who collaborated with the international programs or the Afghan government. Where villages were under the protection of international military forces, the Taliban promised to retaliate once those troops left. 86 usaid initiatives: implementation versus program design Thus far, this section has criticized justice-sector program implementation in Afghanistan, but this issue highlights more fundamental problems with USAID management and oversight. Invariably, USAID sought to control the scope and content of its projects as well as their implementation. This tendency to micromanage was reºected in contracts that "specif[ied] precisely what the U.S. contracting partners are to do at every step of the way throughout a project." 87 The level of centralized control in the Afghanistan contracts was stunning, particularly given the ºuidity of the situation and the need for a nuanced, localized approach when trying to engage local communities. In addition to USAID's inherent contractual power to modify programming, Tetra Tech and Checchi were required to submit elaborate performance-monitoring plans for approval. USAID's drive toward ever-greater quantiªcation and control stemmed largely from the need to establish to the U.S. Congress exactly how funding was spent and what had been achieved. Yet USAID's in-house capacities had been largely "hollowed out." 88 This vicious cycle was particularly evident in Afghanistan, because the extensive demands of contracting generated a general shortage of qualiªed applicants. Affairs, the Interior Ministry, the Independent National Legal Training Center, and the Supreme Court. Staff numbers were signiªcant. In 2011, for example, the JSSP employed "93 Afghan legal experts, 65 American advisors, and over 100 Afghan support staff." 91 Training was undertaken on a massive scale, with "a grand total of over 300 JSSP courses training over 13,500 students." 92 Training occurred in all thirty-four provinces for judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other legal personnel. By the end of 2014, the JSSP had developed and implemented a comprehensive case-management system active in eighteen provinces, featuring data on 104,000 cases. 93 The program provided assistance with legislative drafting and law implementation. It also created new institutions-notably, the Attorney General's Anti-Corruption Unit, the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association, and the Ministry of Justice's Planning Directorate.
Despite the JSSP's broad reach and substantial funding, at its core the JSSP was a straightforward judicial capacity-building program that invested heavily in the state justice sector. Although larger in scope, both the means and the ends of the JSSP were strikingly similar to those of USAID's AROLP and RLS-Formal programs. In terms of results, comprehensive audits of the JSSP have shown no demonstrable evidence that the program advanced the rule of law or even met its own programmatic objectives. 94 Despite extensive training, no key justice-sector institutions displayed a meaningful commitment to uniform application of the law or a willingness to follow it. New laws were passed but were not consistently enforced. All major justice-sector institutions remained ªrmly under the control of "one of the most corrupt regimes on the planet." 95 The State Department cast the Afghan state's failure to address corruption as a failure of "political will," rather recognizing that corruption was intrinsic to the system. The JSSP consistently faced major management, oversight, and implementation issues, including a series of "poorly designed deliverables," which in turn led to the actual deliverables produced being "useless. (1) enhance human resources, (2) construct justice infrastructure, (3) increase public awareness and access to state courts, and (4) improve physical security for judges and other judicial actors in ten provinces. 98 Apart from the fourth priority, ROLFF-A's objectives were decidedly conventional. ROLFF-A attempted to strengthen the state justice system by working primarily with the Supreme Court, the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior, and the High Ofªce of Oversight for Anti-Corruption. The program proclaimed neutrality regarding nonstate justice, "provided that dispute resolution is not administered by the Taliban or other insurgent groups." 99 Although the national government had yet to formalize its relationship with nonstate justice actors, the program sought to engage "Afghan Justice Sector actors to build linkages between the two systems." 100 ROLFF-A was fully integrated within larger stability and counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan that stressed that "establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state." 101 As the program's commander, Brig. Gen. Mark Martins, explained, ROLFF-A sought to "establish rule-of-law green zones." 102 Over time a "hub-and-spoke linkage between green zones in key provinces and districts" would emerge, which in turn would help "create a system of justice at the subnational level." 103 In other words, the rule of law was conceptualized as a cornerstone of broader efforts to build the state from the bottom up, while failing to acknowledge just how ambitious, optimistic, and ahistorical this belief was. After all, why would nonstate actors suddenly embrace the state legal system that showed no sign of improving and at the cost of potential insurgent retaliation? The U.S. military interventions never grappled with the fact that a hub-and-spoke system made little sense if the state justice sector failed to simultaneously improve. Furthermore, as the rule of law takes decades to establish even under favorable circumstances, it was naïve to believe that it could be instituted through a short-term surge in forces. 104 ROLFF-A faced a multitude of serious issues. Its programming incorrectly assumed that stabilization and rule-of-law programming were functional equivalents. As with the RLS-Informal initiative, ROLFF-A sought to build stability on quick wins and demonstrable outputs to ªll a nonexistent justice vacuum. The program's approach was at odds with a legal landscape deªned by ongoing, ªerce combat, and its achievements remain speculative. The Defense Department still does not know how much money was spent. 105 Ironically for a military initiative, insecurity undermined the program. U.S. military forces generally could not protect against Taliban attacks in the short term, let alone once programming ceased. The mere presence of the military could incite violence as local actors scrambled to acquire external resources.
The overt militarization of rule-of-law assistance and its counterinsurgent use in Afghanistan generated additional problems. First, the assumptions underpinning counterinsurgency operations were dubious. As Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder have written, there is a "surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives" in Afghanistan and more generally. 106 The strategy reºected a unilateral decision by U.S. policymakers rather than a cooperative strategy with the Afghan regime. 107 Afghan government ofªcials desired military support to defeat the Taliban but were decidedly disinterested in furthering legal reform.
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Second, the program reºected some notable misunderstandings and misperceptions. The Defense Department consistently stressed that the nonstate actors it engaged were authentic, traditional, and organic. In reality, "authority over life and death was simultaneously located in other institutions and actors, namely external interveners," rather than nonstate justice actors, who largely depended on external forces for their authority. 108 Moreover, the enforcement of "rule-of-law green zones" within a hub-and-spoke system relied on the prospect of external force. State courts had little ability to implement their rulings. Even more troubling, the thoroughly corrupt, deeply compromised state judicial institutions could not provide stability. Even if all areas were cleared and every insurgent defeated, the state would still lack a legitimate legal order. There was no hub to build spokes around. ROLFF-A starkly highlights external actors' limited capacity to advance the rule of law even when it is overtly backed by military force. Even in the best of circumstances, establishing the rule of law takes time. Thus, a rule-of-law green zone means little unless it exists for years and is linked to powerful domestic constituencies committed to the rule of law.
programmatic progress and challenges Although the programs detailed above achieved a few tactical gains and helped build some state judicial infrastructure, no U.S. program meaningfully advanced the rule of law in Afghanistan. Each faced signiªcant challenges in a complex, legally pluralist environment with serious security concerns. The biggest problem, however, was that key state actors were not committed to the rule of law, and there was little real demand for U.S. assistance. Without high-level state efforts to reduce corruption, improve judicial performance, and engage constructively with nonstate tribal and religious actors, judicial state-building assistance would always achieve little regardless of expenditure or program design. Indeed, when efforts were made to "investigat[e] corruption, they were rebuked by Karzai's ofªcials for misunderstanding the nature of patronage networks that served to support the government." 109 Yet, U.S. policymakers chose to keep investing in efforts they knew were not working. Policymakers, donors, and implementers embraced wildly optimistic assumptions to rationalize the perpetuation of failing programs and policies. U.S. decisionmakers made clear policy and programmatic choices that had profound consequences. 
Conceptualizing International Judicial State-Building in Afghanistan
When the Taliban regime collapsed, Afghanistan's legal system displayed a high degree of legal pluralism. Yet, most disputes were still settled based on tribal codes. Initial security arrangements outside the capital were predicated on alliances between the state and armed strongmen. U.S. assistance reºected the optimistic and ultimately unrealistic idea that these tacit alliances would become less necessary as state courts gained capacity and authority. While aid focused on bolstering state justice-sector institutions for more than half a decade during the Bush administration, Obama administration policymakers subsequently determined that subsidization alone was insufªcient.
In 2009, the United States' policy rhetoric regarding Afghanistan's legal system began to shift, but its initiatives remained focused around a litany of highly repetitive trainings and capacity-building projects. Policy reºected a combination of political expediency and security concerns that bore little resemblance to the grandiose claims about ensuring the rule of law and promoting access to justice for ordinary Afghans. The United States consistently revamped its ofªcial approach. Still, as highlighted above, improvement always remained elusive. Yet while programs were problematic, the overarching issue was strategy and the attempt to build the rule of law in partnership with a regime that was certainly interested in passing regulations for society at large but had no interest in being bound by the law itself, ending impunity, or promoting the rule of law. After all, writes Jane Stromseth "even the most formal, minimalist conception of the rule of law requires a normative commitment to the project of the rule of law" by state ofªcials at the highest level. 110 strategies for addressing the nonstate justice sector The previous section highlighted the most important programmatic initiatives undertaken with a goal of advancing the rule of law in Afghanistan. This section focuses on the overarching strategies employed by U.S. policymakers to further this objective. Even if unstated, there are ªve main strategies for conceptualizing engagement between the state and nonstate systems in highly legally pluralist settings such as Afghanistan: (1) bridging, (2) harmonization, (3) incorporation, (4) subsidization, and (5) repression. These strategies are conceptually distinct though by no means mutually exclusive or hermetically sealed in practice. Success can never be guaranteed by strategy alone, but certain environments favor certain strategies. Bridging approaches aim to allocate cases between the state and nonstate justice systems as appropriate given relevant state law and participant preferences. Harmonization seeks to transform nonstate justice principles and outputs to be consistent with the state system's professed core values in key areas-most frequently, nonstate actors' treatment of women. 111 Under incorporation, nonstate justice becomes state justice as those venues are placed under the authority of state actors. Incorporation can take the form of religious or customary courts or the designation of nonstate justice actors as courts of ªrst instance. Alternatively, decisions from the nonstate system could be tentative, subject to appeal or ratiªcation by state ofªcials. Subsidization, which can take a variety of forms, seeks to increase the capacity, performance, and popularity of state justice. Certain core techniques, nevertheless, recur across settings-most notably, legislative reform, capacity building, physical infrastructure construction, supporting symbolic representation, and increased public engagement. In contrast, repression aims to eliminate the state's judicial rivals. When the state is strong enough, this can take the form of simply prohibiting nonstate justice forums. Almost invariably, however, repression entails signiªcant violence. Repression can be essential when the state faces an existential threat from nonstate justice actors, particularly when linked to an armed insurgency, but it is invariably fraught with risks of reciprocal violence.
Rule of Law in
subsidization strategy, 2002-08 Once U.S. rule-of-law promotion efforts in Afghanistan began in earnest in 2004, they focused overwhelmingly on subsidization. The vast majority of the country's judicial infrastructure had been destroyed during the conºict. Qualiªed legal professionals were scarce, and their training needs were daunting. 112 International assistance was a prerequisite for enabling most justicesector organizations to function at all. Subsidization thus reºected a clear, compelling rationale: the state justice sector desperately needed improved human resources, training, supplies, and infrastructure. International aid was focused on building modern state institutions that acted in accordance with the rule of law. The subsidization approach was deeply embedded in nearly all ju- The initial international efforts faced substantial criticism for allocating insufªcient resources to state reconstruction. 114 Yet, Afghanistan received an immense amount of support relative to other contemporary peacebuilding missions, and its aid absorptive capacity was limited. 115 Merely increasing assistance does not guarantee improvement and often produces signiªcant problems. As discussed earlier, the rule of law takes decades to establish, and there is no area where more rule-of-law assistance would have clearly translated into better justice or a state more committed to the rule of law.
Subsidization achieved little given its slow start, state disinterest, and poor strategic choices. These choices included failing to establish nationwide security during a period of relative calm, outsourcing security to warlords, and allowing consolidation of authority in the executive and a culture of corruption to ºourish. 116 State ofªcials generally cared little for U.S.-backed legal modernization plans. Moreover, the programmatic initiatives were decidedly uninspired. As Thomas Carothers has observed, assistance to Afghanistan exempliªed a "breathtakingly mechanistic approach to rule-of-law development" focused on replicating "institutional endpoints"-an approach that has been widely discredited. 117 The pattern described by Carothers neatly captures Afghanistan's situation, where programmers assessed "in what ways selected institutions do not resemble their counterparts in countries that donors believe embody successful rule of law-and then attempting to modify or reshape those institutions to ªt the desired model. If a court lacks access to legal materials, then those legal materials should be provided. If case management in the courts is dysfunctional, it should be brought up to Western standards. If a criminal procedure law lacks adequate protections for detainees, it should be rewritten. The basic idea is that if the institutions can be changed to ªt the models, the rule of law will emerge." 118 Outside investments in the state jus- tice sector, however, produced no discernible progress toward furthering the rule of law in Afghanistan.
In 2006, international actors began to express growing interest in Afghanistan's nonstate justice sector. Policy suggestions included bridging through the creation of mutually constitutive institutional links between state and nonstate dispute resolution mechanisms, harmonization through attempts to ensure that nonstate dispute resolution forums act in a manner consistent with state law, and incorporation efforts to establish some sort of overarching system where jirgas and shuras would function akin to courts of ªrst instance. 119 Although it was a growing area of interest intellectually, programming largely left the nonstate justice sector untouched throughout the Bush administration. a road not taken By far the most thoughtful and compelling attempt to constructively engage with nonstate justice in Afghanistan was not a U.S. initiative at all. Rather it was an initiative proposed in a major UNDP report, "Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007." The report forcefully advocated for a "hybrid model of Afghan justice" that would include "the creation of cost-effective ADR [alternative dispute resolution] and Human Rights Units alongside the state justice system. ADR Units would be responsible for selecting appropriate mechanisms to settle disputes outside the courtroom. This would include jirgas/shuras, Community Development Councils, and other civil society organizations. ADR mechanisms would handle minor criminal incidents and civil cases, while giving Afghans a choice to have their cases heard at the nearest state court. All serious criminal cases would fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the formal justice system. When ADR decisions are not satisfactory to the disputants, they can be taken back to the formal, state justice system." 120 The report, however, provoked "an angry and threatening response from Afghan judicial and state justice institutions." 121 Given the opposition of International Security 42:1 138 key Afghan political and legal elites, it is no surprise that the hybrid model never became ofªcial U.S. policy.
Yet, the UNDP report nonetheless proved inºuential. Ideas from the report were selectively harnessed by policymakers for numerous initiatives, including a series of U.S.-funded pilot programs, the Defense Department-backed projects that used nonstate justice mechanisms for counterinsurgency discussed above, and the ºawed 2010 "Draft Law on Dispute Resolution Shura and Jirga." 122 Each initiative, however, fell short of its goals. 123 The report offered a coherent policy vision, but to be implemented, let alone work effectively, the proposed hybrid model required strong support from the Afghan justice sector and the regime more generally. There would need to be a serious commitment to building a more constructive relationship between state and nonstate justice actors, as well as a broader commitment to reducing corruption and ending impunity. Absent these fundamental shifts, the hybrid model had no chance of success. a comprehensive, but inchoate approach, 2009-14 President Obama pledged to defeat the insurgency and stabilize the Afghan state while avoiding an open-ended military commitment. Nearly all U.S. aid, including rule-of-law assistance, emphasized these objectives. The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, argued that effective counterinsurgency involved bolstering the quality of and access to both state and nonstate justice mechanisms "that offer swift and fair resolution of disputes, particularly at the local level," to disrupt the Taliban and their justice system. 124 To achieve these goals, McChrystal believed that the international community had to "work with GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] to develop a clear mandate and boundaries for local informal justice systems." 125 After a comprehensive policy review, Obama ordered an "Afghanistan surge" modeled on similar efforts to stabilize Iraq against insurgent advances. The president authorized the deployment of 30,000 additional ground troops to stabilize the country, but these forces would begin to be withdrawn after eighteen months. Obama likewise dramatically increased civilian engagement efforts, including initiatives to promote the rule of law. In addition to a vast in- crease in funds, the administration roughly "tripled the total U.S. government civilian presence in Afghanistan from 300 to 1,000, overseeing additional thousands of contracted civilian implementing partners." 126 It also drastically increased U.S. subsidization of the state justice sector. Even after the drawdown, funding levels for rule-of-law programs remained well above pre-2009 levels. The administration demonstrated a willingness to try any strategy that might help defeat the Taliban insurgency, however implausible. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, the United States remained wedded to the "vacuum" theory of judicial state-building as a foundation of the U.S. government's ruleof-law assistance approach. For instance, the 2010 "Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy" emphasized that "[j]ustice and rule of law programs will focus on creating predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have exploited with their own brutal form of justice. 127 The U.S. strategy was largely agnostic about whether Afghans sought justice, provided they eschewed Taliban courts. This approach to nonstate justice displayed admirable pragmatism compared with earlier efforts that emphasized replicating a Western-style judiciary. Yet, this agnostic approach was undermined because programs addressing the state justice system were still trying to do exactly that. With so many moving, highly contingent, and largely uncoordinated parts, the strategic objective was never clear. U.S. policymakers viewed nonstate justice mechanisms as instrumentally important to their overarching goals of counterinsurgency and stabilization. There was never a serious attempt, however, to engage with the three main pillars of legitimacy: cultural afªnity, Islam, and the provision of public goods, including forums for fair and equitable dispute resolution.
simultaneous judicial state-building strategies
The Obama administration's transformative plans for Afghanistan were crystallized in the uniªed civil-military U.S. Foreign Assistance plan for 2011 to 2015. 128 The plan explains, "The principal focus of the U.S. rule of law effort is to reverse the public perception of GIRoA as weak or predatory by help-ing the Afghan government and local communities develop responsive and predictable dispute resolution mechanisms that offer an alternative to the Taliban shadow justice system. Assistance will be provided in support of Afghan efforts to strengthen the formal state justice system, stabilize the traditional justice system, and build a safe, secure, and humane civilian corrections system." 129 Informal justice was explicitly linked to counterinsurgency efforts. The United States wanted to collaborate with preexisting nonstate actors but also "re-establish[] traditional dispute mechanisms" as part of broader efforts to counter the Taliban's parallel justice system. 130 It created nonstate dispute resolution forums, albeit ones without long-standing cultural and religious roots. This endeavor involved local research on nonstate systems and how they could be utilized to defeat the Taliban. Thus, each strategy ostensibly promoted goals in the legal sector, but primarily to support counterinsurgency efforts.
As examined below, U.S. assistance was expanded and diversiªed to include various strategies and engagement with both state and nonstate justice actors. It did not, however, produce the desired results. Behind the transformative rhetoric, the United States' bold vision for rule-of-law assistance was underpinned by the following four wildly optimistic "critical assumptions." 1. The Afghan government will implement its reinvigorated plans to ªght corruption, with measures of progress toward greater accountability. 2. Justice and rule of law programs will focus on creating predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have exploited. 3. USG [U.S. government] programs will successfully address local ofªcials' lack of education, experience, and limited resources. 4. GIRoA action will counter obstruction from local powerbrokers whose activities are sometimes inconsistent with the Afghan constitution. 131
Each of these assumptions was clearly unrealistic. The Karzai administration never sought to eliminate state corruption. The justice system displayed few signs of improvement, lacked a commitment to the rule of law, and remained subject to executive inºuence. As evidenced by the serious challenges faced by well-funded U.S. programs aimed at Afghan state institutions that placed a major emphasis on capacity building, resource restraints and lack of knowledge were rarely the reason rule-of-law initiatives underperformed.
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129. U.S. Mission Afghanistan, "U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan," p. 5. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid., p. 10. Moreover, the Karzai regime and the U.S. government were in league with powerbrokers who actively opposed advancing the rule of law. Although they found warlords unsavory, U.S. policymakers partnered with them to try to defeat the Taliban, and there was never a serious attempt at disarmament. Afghanistan's rule-of-law situation saw very little improvement by the time Afghans elected a new president in 2014, in a process marked by even greater fraud and controversy than the 2009 elections.
subsidization. In 2009, the U.S. government renewed its pledge to "support capacity development of the formal state courts." 132 The new strategy's core was, in reality, a supersized reincarnation of the preexisting subsidization strategy. For example, funding from the State Department INL Bureau for ruleof-law assistance in Afghanistan ballooned from $26.5 million in 2006 to $328 million in 2010. 133 Yet, massive funding increases failed to transform the Afghan justice sector or even produce notable improvements. Instead, they demonstrated the limits of what subsidization could achieve absent an ideological commitment by the state to the rule of law. As noted previously, the Karzai regime was hostile toward efforts to strengthen the rule of law, which could undermine both its freedom of action and its patronage system. The Supreme Court and other key judicial organs were open to receiving aid, but only on their terms and never in a way that ultimately threatened the overarching system. harmonization. A harmonization push sought to make the nonstate justice system in Afghanistan operate on principles akin to the state system or, more accurately, on an idealized conceptualization of state justice that protects human rights and upholds the rule of law. It involved both supply-and demand-side activities. On the supply side, "tribal elders/religious leaders who conduct shuras would receive training on relevant state and religious law." 134 On the demand side, U.S. assistance would increase Afghans' awareness regarding their legal rights and how to assert them. Assistance would thus help align the behavior of state and nonstate actors, and bolster nonstate actors' willingness to support the state. There is little to suggest that U.S. initiatives caused Afghans to view state law more favorably or nonstate justice mechanisms to operate more procedurally or substantively like state courts. Neither was there any increase in the "enforcement of the rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups." 135 Harmonization failed because nonstate justice actors largely remained wary of state courts, and human rights concerns proved readily expendable when they were seen as clashing with security and counterinsurgency goals.
bridging. Bridging between the state and nonstate justice sectors in Afghanistan became a more prominent strategy after 2009. The United States sought to "establish[] linkages, as appropriate, between the informal and state systems." 136 This strategy envisioned Afghan citizens enjoying free access to both systems as appropriate, predicated on a sensible jurisdictional divide. For example, whereas a judge may refer a property theft to a local jirga, state courts would retain exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes such as murder. In reality, however, the state lacked the capacity to compel most nonstate justice actors to use state courts. The quality of state justice remained poor; thus there was no demand. RLS-Informal witnessed no discernible increase in popular demand for state courts. 137 Although aid likely increased public awareness and perhaps even access, it was a proverbial bridge to nowhere as the public demand for state justice remained sparse.
incorporation. Incorporation envisioned a partnership among the implementers of U.S rule of law programs, the Afghan Ministry of Justice, and other relevant agencies "to formalize links between the two systems [state and nonstate justice] to maximize the beneªts of both systems and to reduce the weaknesses." 138 These ambitious ideals were prominent in the 2009 draft nonstate justice policy, which was promoted and signed by various state representatives and international backers. Although it recognized the potential beneªts of nonstate justice, the policy demanded that "informal dispute resolution decisions need to be consistent with Shariah, the Constitution, other Afghan laws and international human rights standards." 139 The policy consensus was shallow, however. There was minimal consultation with tribal nonstate justice actors, and no clear vision existed as to how to address the de facto authority of warlords in the areas they controlled.
The September 2010 "Draft Law on Dispute Resolution Shuras and Jirgas" imagined nonstate justice actors as part of the state system. Consequently, it heavily regulated their jurisdiction, operations, and decisionmaking as well as their relationship to state courts. 140 As such, the draft law included harmoniza- tion and bridging elements alongside incorporation. The law staunchly asserted the state's authority to control and regulate all aspects of nonstate dispute resolution. In addition, it stipulated that jirga participants "and parties of dispute shall be duty bound to observe provisions of this law" or face criminal charges, even though jirgas were only empowered to hear civil disputes and petty juvenile crimes on referral. 141 Jirgas and shuras could not "make decisions that violate human rights of parties in dispute, especially of women and children," and all judgments would have been subject to appeal to state courts. 142 The law was not passed, however, having met ªerce opposition from the Ministry of Women's Affairs and the Human Rights Commission, which feared that it would lend credibility to "traditional" dispute resolution, which they view as antithetical to human rights standards and women's rights. 143 The state was open to engagement with the nonstate justice sectors but only on its own, stark terms. The central government's internal divisions ultimately prevented the law from being promulgated. Even if a law had been enacted, it is unlikely to have meaningfully altered the operation of dispute resolution at the local level given the weakness of state authority in many areas.
repression. Afghan state and international forces sought to shake and undermine the Taliban justice system. At the same time, these actors realized that the popular appeal of Taliban justice constituted a profound challenge to state authority. Although rule-of-law programs were not trying to destroy the Taliban system and eliminate its core personnel, with the partial exception of ROLFF-A, they aimed to undermine the system's appeal. Doing so proved remarkably difªcult, however, because the state system remained unappealing. By the end of 2014, it was clear that Taliban justice was a major and growing feature of the Afghan legal landscape.
Learning from Lessons Not Learned
Advancing the rule of law in Afghanistan presented a daunting challenge regardless of policy decisions undertaken by the United States. Yet, state-building efforts in Afghanistan started optimistically. The Taliban regime wilted away with minimal resistance. The new, multi-ethnic state under President Karzai had a real opportunity to demonstrate that it was a legitimate governing entity. 144 That opportunity was squandered, but it was squandered as a re-International sult of domestic and international policy choices. The Afghan state now faces a crisis of legitimacy and a powerful insurgency that promises the law and order the state has failed to provide, but to cast that outcome as inevitable serves to excuse bad policy and invites future disasters. Afghanistan is not alone. Advancing the rule of law after conºict will constitute a major foreign policy challenge for the foreseeable future. As extensive legal pluralism characterizes many societies, particularly conºict-prone ones, future interventions and subsequent efforts to advance the rule of law will almost certainly occur in places marked by a high degree of legal pluralism, such as Yemen or Syria. As a result, Afghanistan offers a rich source of insights for helping to ensure that future judicial state-building endeavors do not simply replicate the same mistakes as U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. a stitch in time . . . Afghanistan's own history shows that a viable, legitimate order was certainly a possibility. Before the late 1970s communist coup, the country had enjoyed decades of domestic tranquility. In the 1990s, the Taliban itself had previously established a monopoly on the use of force under even more chaotic conditions. After the end of Taliban rule in 2001, Afghanistan enjoyed relative peace before violence began to rapidly metastasize, and ªghting constituted "a fullblown insurgency by 2006." 145 Moreover, Afghanistan's population has certainly demonstrated capacity for violence. At the same time, they prize order, as evidenced by the paramount role of Pashtunwali and other nonstate dispute resolution systems, and by widespread acceptance of a national state for centuries, albeit a limited one. Thus, rather than bemoan the country's hopelessness, it is important to critically examine how Afghanistan rule-of-law assistance and broader U.S. policy could have been undertaken more effectively.
At the onset of post-conºict reconstruction efforts, international actors have maximum inºuence and the broadest range of feasible options. 146 The state judicial sector in Afghanistan faced major entrenched challenges, including minimal infrastructure, serious human resources shortfalls, dubious legitimacy, and skepticism from the nonstate authorities that oversaw most local dispute resolution. There was a clear, constructive opportunity for international assistance to help address these issues. As the lead nation, however, Italy did little until 2003 and then achieved little until it was relieved of those duties in 2006. Italy's performance has been rightly criticized, but the loss of this window of opportunity was not solely Italy's fault. The United States decided to topple the Taliban and was by far the most dominant international player in determining policy afterward. Italy's lead-nation status was not inevitable or even particularly logical, but rather a reºection of the U.S. policy of outsourcing to other nations as many aspects of state-building as it could during the crucial early period.
establishing the foundation State legitimacy and institutional arrangements are vital for the development of the rule of law. International rule-of-law assistance is almost invariably mediated through state institutions and ofªcials, even when targeting nonstate actors. It matters immensely whether the state is seen as legitimate and whether those entrusted with the state's authority care about promoting a state bound by the rule of law. As noted earlier, President Karzai's regime was decidedly disinterested in the rule of law and opposed meaningful efforts to advance it. In general, policymakers should be deeply skeptical of the assurances of corrupt rulers with authoritarian tendencies.
The international community also bears responsibility for aiding and abetting Afghanistan's governance disaster. The rule of law is tightly linked to democratic accountability. The legal order is inexorably interconnected with a state's political institutions. 147 In theory, the "rule of law may exist without democratic forms of political will formation," but on "empirical grounds" the rule of law has been inexorably linked with democratic government. 148 Democratic rule does not inevitably produce the rule of law. Nevertheless, democracy appears to be a functional prerequisite. 149 As Guillermo O'Donnell highlights, "Only under a democratic rule of law will the various agencies of electoral, societal, and horizontal accountability function effectively, without International Security 42:1 146 obstruction and intimidation from powerful state actors." 150 In the early years, the international community exercised meaningful inºuence over the development of the nascent Afghan state's institutional structure. International backing secured the top state post for Karzai initially and encouraged the president's concentration of power. Once entrenched, this institutional arrangement proved resistant to change. Individuals who reach the top spot ªrst have a disproportionate advantage going forward and can use their position to undermine future democratic competition. 151 International actors need to be cautious with their support. They must also push for institutional mechanisms such as free elections, political parties, and political accountability mechanisms to ensure that the people themselves have a real decision regarding who leads their country.
As the United States viewed security as its top priority in Afghanistan from the very start, concern about the rule of law often fell to the background. Thus, the United States' ability to promote the rule of law has been heavily circumscribed by its entrenched commitment to the regime and an emphasis on security over justice. Karzai's administration sought to retain power and exercise authority unconstrained by law. In contrast, both Bush and Obama administration policymakers wanted an Afghan liberal democratic polity that embraced the rule of law, but they consistently compromised that aspiration. The Karzai regime recognized that U.S. policymakers believed that the statebuilding project in Afghanistan could not be seen to fail, and that to admit that it was failing would have risked being seen as tacit acceptance of a Taliban victory. Over time, the Afghan state's endemic, profound weakness gave the regime a greater ability to operate with independence from its international backers as the prospect of a Taliban victory became increasingly plausible.
Democracy and the rule of law demand more than free-and-fair elections, but electoral integrity is a prerequisite. Although U.S. policymakers expressed concerns about Afghan electoral processes, particularly after the initial presidential election in 2004, they never pushed to ensure credible elections. Fraud was perpetrated on an industrial scale in every election after 2004. 152 Yet each time, U.S. ofªcials expressed concerns only after the event, when it was too late to take serious action. They also did little as Karzai's regime systematically sought to undermine the existence of political parties that could form the institutional bases for aggregating social interests, and the regime methodically compromised the integrity of voting registration, oversight, and administration processes. 153 U.S. commitments to promoting the rule of law cannot be effective or credible when democracy is not a policy priority.
rethinking aid domestically and internationally Rule-of-law assistance in Afghanistan was problematic both in how it was implemented and how it was structured bureaucratically. With regard to implementation, U.S. efforts reºected fundamental failures of timing, coordination, and strategy. Assistance was scarce during the crucial early interval and then was focused on unneeded and unwanted legislative reforms. 154 Once funding began to dramatically increase, there was no plausible strategy as to how the assistance would actually advance the rule of law. Worse, once it became clear that subsidization was facilitating state corruption rather combating it, aid was not reconsidered, reallocated, or halted. Subsidization efforts continued and expanded with no realistic vision for how assistance could be improved. Even today, U.S. ofªcials show little interest in changing their approach to dealing with institutions decidedly disinterested in the rule of law. The latest USAID rule-of-law program, known as "Adalat," has as a major goal "combatting corruption by empowering relevant Afghan Government agencies/ institutions." 155 The irony is presumably unintentional. Although implementers receive the most scrutiny, this perverse incentive structure is fundamentally a policymaking issue. Most nongovernmental organizations must respond to donor-established incentives to survive. 156 Operationally, program coordination remained consistently abysmal from 2004 to 2014. Even prior to the dramatic increase in rule-of-law expenditures under Obama's Afghan surge, the U.S. State Department Ofªce of Inspector General admitted that there was "no way to readily identify ROL [rule of law] funding and subsequently to identify duplicate programs, overlapping programs, or programs conºicting with each other." 157 Massive funding increases exacerbated these long-standing issues. It was unclear even how many programs there were or how much money had been spent. 158 Throughout the International Security 42:1 148 period of U.S. engagement examined here, program strategy, implementation, and coordination problems were always being addressed but were never solved.
These programming issues reºect larger, more profound problems within the U.S. international assistance bureaucracy. U.S. donors, particularly USAID, demand extensive control over the scope, content, and implementation of projects they support. This level of micromanagement was an especially bad ªt for Afghanistan given the ºuidity of the situation and the need for a nuanced, localized approach. If programs are supposed to be dynamic, there needs to be ºexibility and an understanding that calculated risks are sometimes necessary. There also needs to be a willingness to halt program activities that are not working or end partnerships with interlocutors that lack meaningful interest in promoting the rule of law. Currently, programs that fail to execute are viewed poorly by donors and endanger future contracts. Program implementers thus have strong incentives to collaborate with deeply corrupt state institutions.
The existing operational structure means that donors can design the program and continually display an almost willful blindness to political reality in the recipient country. The contracting system is not without signiªcant ºaws. Nevertheless, by deªnition the contractors' job is simply to follow USAID's directives. 159 More generally, this dynamic institutionalizes an unaccountability loop whereby donors can blame contractors when programs go awry, while contractors can claim that they were simply following donor instructions. Although admittedly a somewhat remote prospect, ªxing this dynamic will require that Congress adopts a more nuanced understanding of how development assistance works and under what circumstances it can be most effective.
engaging justice holistically
As with most conºict-prone states, nonstate justice mechanisms still handle the vast majority of disputes in Afghanistan. U.S. policymakers belatedly recognized nonstate justice as a major pillar of Afghanistan's legal order, but they never seriously engaged nonstate justice as a preexisting structure or an independent source of legitimate authority. Instead, preferred local interlocutors were labeled the key nonstate justice actors, independent of their actual social standing, and then bolstered through military force and outside funds. As Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason write, successful policy engagement with the nonstate justice system of Pashtunwali demands, at a minimum, "an un- derstanding of the core principles of this cultural value system." 160 While ruleof-law programs researched local areas, outputs were ªxed and unrelated to local realities because counterinsurgency was always the paramount goal.
The uneven results in Afghanistan also seriously challenge the dominant U.S. counterinsurgency view that holds that "establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state." 161 Although the rule of law is certainly worthy as both, it takes decades and is invariably rooted in domestic politics. 162 Thus, it is a long-term goal. Moreover, the rule of law cannot be promoted successfully absent powerful domestic constituencies and at least some high-level state ofªcials who take the idea seriously. International rule-of-law efforts, whether geared toward counterinsurgency or simply trying to improve the quality and effectiveness of state courts, have a limited scope absent a state commitment to be bound by the law. Aid can easily become another source of rent extraction for a rentier state. 163
Conclusion
Despite Afghanistan's immense importance to U.S. foreign policy for more than a decade, rule-of-law assistance has often been ad hoc, ineffective, and predicated on widely optimistic assumptions. At worst, it has helped enable predatory state practices. The vast majority of aid served to prop up fundamentally compromised institutions, while democracy was jettisoned in pursuit of security and little thought was given to the constructive engagement of the tribal and religious actors who have long formed crucial pillars of legal legitimacy. International actors accepted the Karzai regime's increasing dependence on warlords who lacked any interest in the rule of law. Over time, the Taliban and its justice system grew in strength and popular legitimacy, in large part as a response to the Karzai regime's corruption and reliance on warlords. International interest in engagement with the nonstate justice sector, however, was focused primarily on counterinsurgency rather than justice. U.S. assistance ultimately produced few beneªts and, in certain instances, was even counterproductive. The situation in Afghanistan should not be taken as an invitation to nihilism, however. Afghanistan may be a case study in how many things can go wrong in post-conºict state-building, but it crucially reºects policy decisions. Different decisions may well have produced more positive results. Taking democracy and legitimate governance seriously is a crucial ªrst step. Policymakers and aid implementers need a realistic and compelling strategic vision rooted in a deep understanding of a country's legal culture, politics, and history. Prompt action must then be taken to advance that vision. Finally, realistic expectations are essential, as developing the rule of law is a long-term process. Policymakers can beneªt from being better able to conceptualize and respond to the challenges posed by judicial state-building in a legally pluralist society, such as Afghanistan. The United States never truly sought to engage with nonstate justice as a means to promote a more just legal order in Afghanistan, but rather saw nonstate actors as mere cogs in a deeply ºawed counterinsurgency approach. Counterfactuals are always fraught. Still, given the widespread desire for a more just legal order and Afghanistan's history of state, tribal, and religious collaboration, a more constructive relationship was certainly possible and likely remains so today. Savvy strategic planning and pragmatic adaptation can improve state-building and rule of law efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but it will require tough choices and occasionally even rethinking the provision of aid.
